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Abstract:  “Counterfactual” readings of might/could have were previously 
analyzed using metaphysical modal bases. This paper presents examples and 
scenarios where the assumptions of such a branching-time semantics are not met, 
because there are facts at the base world that exclude the complement of the 
modal becoming true.  Additional arguments show that counterfactual readings 
are context-dependent.  These data motivate a semantics using a circumstantial 
(or factual) modal base, which refers to context-dependent facts about a world 
and time.  The analysis is formulated in a version of the premise semantics for 
modality. 
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Sentences like (1) and (2) have readings which seem to describe unrealized past 
possibilities: at the mentioned time, it was possible for him to win, but this possibility 
was not realized.  At some past time, it was possible for Ljubojević to become world 
champion in 1978, but that possibility was not realized.  Such readings of might have and 
could have are called counterfactual readings in this paper.  The same verb complexes 
have epistemic readings, describing epistemic uncertainty at the present time about a 
situation in the past.  Thus (2) can describe the speaker’s uncertainty at a speech time 
about whether Ljubojević was world champion in 1978 or not.  Such epistemic readings 
are not the topic of this paper. 
(1) At that time, he might still have won the game but he didn’t in the end.  
(Condoravdi 2002). 
(2) Ljubojević might have been the world champion of chess in 1978.         
Mondadori (1978). 
Mondadori (1978) and Condoravdi (2002) proposed a semantic analysis of 
counterfactual readings using branching world-time models.  These passages from 
Mondadori’s and Condoravdi’s papers describe the idea succinctly.  
Consequently, the reason that “might” is indexed to the future must be sought 
elsewhere.  I suggest that it can be found in the circumstance that “might” is 
generally associated with a picture of time as “branching”.  Thus when I claim 
that Ljubojević might be the world champion in chess in 1978, it is (now) “open” 
to him to go on and become the next world champion in chess.    (Mondadori 
1978) 
  2 
The counterfactual reading involves a future possibility in the past and the 
modality is metaphysical.  [1] is used to communicate that  we are now located in 
a world whose past included the (unactualized) possibility of his winning the 
game.  The possibility is about how the world might have turned out to be: at 
some point in the past the world was such that it could evolve into a world in 
which he won the game.  At the relevant point in the past, the issue whether he 
won or not had not been settled and the world could have developed in either way.                                 
(Condoravdi 2002) 
In a branching model construction, the possibility of the base world w0 at a time t 
evolving into a world in which he wins the game is explicated using branching: there 
must be a world w in which he wins after time t, and which branches from w0 at a time no 
earlier than t.  
In her compositional analysis, Condoravdi proposed that for “he might have won” to 
be true, the clause “he might win” has to be true in the past. This is achieved by an LF 
where “have” has scope over the modal as shown in the syntactic representation (3)b for 
(3)a.1  The order of the operators is as follows:  first present tense, then might, then the 
atomic sentence he win.  (3)c gives some of Condoravdi’s morpheme meanings and 
related definitions.  The morphemes combine by function application to produce the 
semantics (3)d for (3)b.   The formula requires that there is a time t such that t precedes 
the utterance time n, and there is a world w which is a “metaphysical” alternative to the 
base world w0 at the past time t, and an event e, which is an event of John winning in w, 
and whose temporal projection τ(e,w) in w is included in the unbounded interval [t,∞) 
running from t to positive infinity.  
(3) a. John might have won.   
b. Pres [have [might [ he win ]]] 
   c. [[ have ]] =  λPλwλt∃t’[t’<t  ∧ AT(t’,w,P) ] 
[[ might ]] = λPλwλt∃w’[M(w,t)(w’)  ∧ AT([t,∞), w’,P) ]  
AT(t,w,P)  =   ∃e [ P(w)(e)   ∧  τ (e,w) ⊆ t  ]  P eventive 
   =  ∃e [ P(w)(e)   ∧  τ (e,w) ° t  ]  P stative 
   =  P(w)(t)     P temporal 
d.  ∃t[t<n ∧ ∃w[M(w0,t)(w) ∧ ∃e[τ(e,w) ⊆ [t,∞) ∧ win(w,e,john)]]] 
There are a couple of things to note about the meaning of might.  First, it is an 
existential quantifier over worlds, and the domain of quantification is a modal base 
M(w0,t).  Stating the semantics in this way is equivalent to using an accessibility relation.  
An important point is that the accessibility relation varies with times in addition to 
worlds.  So, fixing w0 and t, M(w0,t) is the set of accessible worlds, and in formula (3)d w 
is an element of this set, that is w is accessible from w0,t.  Second, the modal builds in 
futurity in the requirement that the event e falls in the unbounded interval [t,∞), so that 
the event time for the winning event e is no earlier than t.2  Finally, there is the idea that 
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the modal base in such sentences consists of “metaphysical” alternatives.  This was 
suggested by Mondadori, and Condoravdi built it into a compositional semantics.  
Metaphysical alternatives are a certain way of formalizing branching of worlds.  A 
metaphysical alternative to w0 at t is a world w which is the same as w up to and 
including t.   This requirement is agnostic as to whether the worlds w0 and w literally 
overlap up to and including t, or whether they are merely qualitatively the same up to t.  
In either case, any difference between w and w0 must come after t, and one can think of w 
as branching off from w0 after t.3 
(4)b gives a picture of Condoravdi’s analysis of (4)a.  In a model where the sentence 
is true at w0 and n, there is a time t1 which precedes n, and a world w which is a 
metaphysical alternative to w0 at t1.  In the alternative world w, there is required to be an 
event e of John winning, which is temporally included in the interval [t1,∞).  Informally, 
w is a branch from w0 after t1 where John later wins.    
(4) a. At that time, he might/could still have won the game 
b.     
w and w0 are same | 
    |                     John win 
//////////////////////////////// |-------------------- e ------------------------------  w 
                           | 
//////////////////////////////// |------------------------------------- n -------------  w0 
                            |   
                             t1 
2. Problems with the branching-time analysis  
It should be emphasized that the analysis using metaphysical alternatives must be taken 
literally.  This means that the base world and the alternative need to be exactly the same 
up to the time of evaluation of the modal. I am going to give some examples and 
scenarios which are problematic for this aspect of the metaphysical analysis. The first one 
is the trees scenario given in (5).  The husband’s statement includes typical counterfactual 
uses of might have, which describe past possibilities which were not realized.  In 
response, the wife made an argument to an opposite conclusion, given in (6).  This is the 
kind of argument one makes just to win an argument, but it seems valid up to the last 
sentence. 
(5) The trees 
There were two huge beautiful old trees in my front yard. In a summer storm, one of 
them was blown down.  Fortunately, it fell away from the house onto the driveway, 
rather than towards the house onto my husband’s office.  When we looked at the 
broken trunk, we saw that it was rotted inside, so this was a dangerous tree.  The trees 
were of similar appearance and age. 
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Husband’s argument:  I might have been killed, because the tree might have fallen 
onto my office. Let’s cut down the other tree.  It might fall onto my office in another 
storm. 
(6) Wife’s Argument: We bought the house for the trees, and now you want to cut them 
down?  Anyway the tree guy told us that because of the location of the rot in the 
trunk, the tree could only fall away from the house.  So the tree could not have fallen 
onto your office. There is no reason to cut down the other tree. 
Sentence (7)a is from the husband’s argument, and (7)b is from the wife’s argument.  The 
relevant reading in (7)b is one where the negation scopes over the modal, so that the 
wife’s sentence has the syntactic form of a negation of the husband’s sentence.4  
Intuitively, one feels that the sentences are superficially contradictory, but that 
nevertheless one can understand each of them as true. 
(7) a.  Husband:  The tree might/could have fallen on my office. 
b.  Wife: The tree could not have fallen on your office. 
Here is the problem for the metaphysical analysis. If the two sentences are to be 
evaluated with respect to a single base world, then that world determines a unique set of 
metaphysical alternatives.  So we can not get both of them to be true on a metaphysical 
reading. A common strategy for resolving this kind of problem is to identify a shift in an 
implicit parameter between the two utterances, so that taking into account the contextual 
parameters, (7)a and (7)b are not contradictory.   It is not clear what this parameter could 
be in the branching time analysis.  Perhaps one could try to say that the husband and wife 
are referring to different worlds, which branch in different ways.  But it seems that the 
husband and wife intend to refer to the same real situation, and do not disagree about any 
matter of fact.  Rather, as I will claim, the wife makes a modal argument which pays 
attention to the specific location of rot in the first tree, while the husband makes a modal 
argument which pays attention to the fact that the tree has internal rot, but considers the 
specific location of the rot (on the driveway side of the tree) a factor which is to be 
ignored, because he wishes to draw a modal conclusion about the other tree. 
The next group of examples involves a special modality which I call sports math 
modality, which is used by sports announcers, writers, and fans.  (8)a is an example with 
the verbal complex could have, and (8)b is a synonymous nominal example.  Sports math 
modality is signaled by the adverb mathematically, and by similar ones such as 
technically.  Temporal adverbs which constrain the temporal argument of the modal fit in 
easily, since when sports math sentences are used, there is usually an intention to talk 
about how possibilities evolve and are gradually foreclosed as time passes.   
 
(8)  a. In week 11 of the football season, mathematically, Buffalo could still have reached 
 the playoffs. 
b. In week 11 there was still a mathematical possibility of Buffalo reaching the 
playoffs.  
Sports modality has a very specific semantics. In evaluating sentences like these, one 
pays attention only to the history of play in w0 up to the reference time t1, the league 
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schedule in w0, and league regulations in w0.  Other facts about w0 are stipulated to be 
irrelevant.  Suppose for instance that in week 11, all of the Buffalo players had broken 
legs, so that it was impossible for Buffolo to win any more games.  Or suppose that the 
officials had been bribed to give advantage to the opponents.  Facts such as these are 
irrelevant to assessing truth in (8) and the sentences can still be true even if there are 
certain facts F about w0 at t1 which absolutely exclude the possibility of Buffolo winning 
any more games, and if winning some more games is essential to Buffalo qualifying. 
The problem for the metaphysical analysis is that, since metaphysical alternatives are 
exactly the same as the base world up to the reference time, the elements of F are also 
facts about the alternatives---the Buffalo players also have broken legs in the alternatives.  
So Buffalo will not reach the playoffs in the metaphysical alternatives either, so that the 
sentences are false if a metaphysical modal base is used in evaluating the modal.  
Intuitively of course, the sentences can be true. 
Here is another example that makes the same point.  I want to imagine a tournament 
which involves people and computer chess programs.  The computer chess programs play 
deterministically, so that once you set them up, it is determined how they are going to 
play.  If you set up two computer chess programs repeatedly in the same way to play with 
each other, they would play the same game again and again.  Now consider a tournament 
involving Ljubojević and two computer chess programs, Shredder 9 and Shredder 10.  
We stipulate that because of the algorithms implemented in those systems, in their 
deterministic play with the given initial conditions Shredder 10 defeats Shredder 9.  On 
Nov. 15, the tournament reached a stage where it was in the sports-math sense possible 
for Ljubojević to reach the quarterfinals.  But because of the particular pattern of results 
so far, that would have required Shredder 9 defeating Shredder 10.  And that is 
impossible because of the algorithms implemented in those systems.  Under these 
circumstances, sentence (9) can still be judged as true in a sports math sense. 
(9)  On Nov. 15, mathematically, Ljubojević could have reached the quarterfinals. 
We are stipulating that if we set up the situation this way it is not possible for 
Shredder 9 to defeat Shredder 10.  Therefore, on Nov. 15, there is no metaphysical 
alternative where Shredder 9 defeats Shredder 10, and therefore, there is no metaphysical 
alternative where Ljubojević reaches the quarterfinals.  But somehow, in evaluating the 
modal sentence understood in a sports-math sense, we can reason as if a defeat of 
Shredder 10 by Shredder 9 is possible.  Apparently, this requires considering alternatives 
which are not metaphysical alternatives.   
If the modal base in these examples is not metaphysical, what is it?  One possibility in 
the tree example is a doxastic or epistemic modal base.  Before the first tree fell, the 
husband would have assented to the conditional sentence (10)a.  In doing so, he takes 
advantage of his information about the geometric and physical configuration of the tree 
and house, and how trees move in storms.  In these circumstances, the belief sentence 
(10)b is also true.  Since the semantics for belief sentences involves quantification over 
doxastic alternatives, this makes it plausible that (7)a in the tree scenario might also 
involve quantification over doxastic alternatives. Perhaps, when implicit parameters are 
filled in, it amounts to something like (11). 
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(10)   a. If the tree falls, it might fall onto the office. 
b. At that time, the husband believed that if the tree fell, it might fall on the office. 
(11) In view of what the husband knew about the property at the time of the storm, 
when the tree fell, it might have fallen on the office. 
Doxastic and epistemic modalities are modalities that use the doxastic (or epistemic) 
state of an agent to determine a set of worlds that serves as the domain of quantification 
for the modal. We can eliminate this option by taking away the agents.  Here is a revised 
scenario. 
(12)  The Trees and orchids 
   The two trees are in a part of the couple’s forest reserve which at the time of the 
storm nobody had ever visited. The tree fell away from a growth of endangered 
orchids.  The couple find it several months after it fell.  The husband makes the 
argument (13)a.  The wife (caring more about trees than flowers) counters with 
(13)b.  The facts about the rot are as before.   
(13)   a. The tree could have fallen on the orchids.  Let’s cut down the other tree.  It might 
fall on the orchids in another storm. 
b. The tree could not have fallen on the orchids, because the rot was on the other 
side. 
The point about that part of the reserve never having been visited until months after 
the storm is that at the time of the storm, there was no agent who had information about 
the trees.  Nobody had ever seen those trees, and no person (or robot, or other agent with 
an epistemic state) had information about them. So the modality in (13) could not be 
doxastic or epistemic, in the sense of using the information of an agent at a time to 
determine a domain of quantification.  
Pragmatically, there is arguably an epistemic or doxastic modality layered above the 
modality in (13), because one can draw conclusions about the speakers’ beliefs at the 
utterance time.  But this is something entirely systematic, which is true also about non-
modal sentences.  Doxastic modality can be made overt as in (14).  This sentence has one 
reading where the modality of could merges with the belief modality.5  This reading does 
not fit with the scenario, because at the time of his statement, the husband knows that the 
tree fell away from the orchids.  The reading that fits into the context has the order or 
operators believe > have > could, and is a counterfactual reading of the kind being 
discussed here.  As argued above, in this scenario and with this order of operators, the 
could-modality is not epistemic or doxastic: the sentence does not describe the husband’s 
beliefs about the information of an agent (either himself or someone else) at the past time. 
(14) The husband believes the tree could have fallen on the orchids.   
Above, I noted that judgments of truth in the tree example shifted, depending on what 
information about the trees one pays attention to.  The following completely invented 
scenario about the Yugoslav and Soviet grand masters brings out the variability.  
Ljubojević lost the title match to Karpov in 1977.  When he worked on strategies 
throughout the 1970s, he explored strategies which Karpov was also examining.  Since 
Karpov was in important respects more capable, Ljubojević lost.  But later analysis 
showed that if he had started working in 1975 on the strategy which later became known 
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as the Mexican Defense (and which Ljubojević became a master of), he might well have 
beaten Karpov. In this context, the sentences in (15) are judged true.  We can justify this 
by pointing out that if Ljubojević had started working on the Mexican defense earlier, he 
might well have won. 
(15) True In 1975, Ljubojević might still have won. 
True In 1975, Ljubojević could still have won. 
Now let’s add some information:  Ljubojević settled on his strategies (the ones that 
Karpov also examined) in the early 1970s.  In those days he was a very methodical 
person who never made changes in strategy. Now the truth value seems to switch.  The 
sentences repeated in (16) seem false because in 1975, he had already selected his 
strategies, and Ljubojević never changes strategy. 
(16) False (?) In 1975, Ljubojević might still have won. 
False (?) In 1975, Ljubojević could still have won. 
False, because although if he had started working on the Mexican defense, he 
might well have won, Ljubojević never changes strategy. 
Comparing results for the two contexts shows that a shift in the context can change 
the truth value of the might have sentence.  When the context does not bring up that 
Ljubojević never changes strategy, the sentence seems true.  When the context does bring 
up that Ljubojević never changes strategy, the sentence seems false, though the intuition 
is a volatile one.  How would this be captured in the branching-time analysis?  A world 
branches in just one way, and it is not clear how the effect of context could be built into 
the analysis.  
What is going on with (15) and (16) is intuitively pretty clear: the truth value shifts 
according to whether or not one “pays attention” to the fact that Ljubojević never changes 
strategy.6  The tree scenario also involved a shift in assumptions: the wife’s argument 
paid attention to the particular location of the rot, while the husband’s argument ignored 
it.  The analysis developed below represents this intuition in a direct way.   
What is the impact of the hypothesis that “anything is possible” on these claimed 
counterexamples to the metaphysical analysis of counterfactual modals?  Despite the 
location of the rot on the opposite side of the trunk, maybe a mighty freak gust of wind 
could knock the tree onto the orchids.   Maybe the players on the other teams could all 
break their legs too, neutralizing Buffalo’s disadvantage.  Maybe the computer on which 
Shredder 10 is running could be afflicted by a rare failure in its circuits, which results in 
behavior that is contrary to the Shredder 10 algorithm.  Many would consider these things 
in principle possible.  If we are working with branching time models, we should not 
dismiss the option that worlds where these odd things happen are genuine metaphysical 
alternatives.  At an extreme, we can assume a space of worlds and times where 
combining an initial temporal half of one world-time line with a final temporal half of 
another results in another world, where everything has changed instantaneously.   This 
would make almost anything metaphysically possible in any world at any time.  While 
models of this kind are a theoretical option that is worth investigating, I think we should 
also look for an analysis that will work with models where all worlds are continuous and 
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naturalistic. Anyway, models where anything is metaphysically possible have bad 
consequences for the metaphysical analysis of counterfactual modals.  In such models 
typical sentences with top-level metaphysical modals are true, and sentences with negated 
metaphysical modals are false.  Since Mondadori and Condoravdi did not consider the 
sentences they were analyzing trivial, “anything is possible” branching-time models are 
not a match for their theory.7 
Before proceeding to an analysis, let us look at a less empirical objection to the 
analysis with metaphysical modal bases. Suppose all the worlds in the model have a 
determinist physics: given a complete description of w0 at t, what happens in w0 after t is 
determined. Then the metaphysical alternative set for w0 at t1 is {w0}, or a set of copies of 
w0.  By copy of w0, I mean a world that is exactly like w0 throughout time.  In a model 
like this, metaphysical modals have no semantic effect.   Here is why. In such a model, in 
the formula (17)b, which is the semantics of (17)a assuming that at that time designates t, 
the existential quantifier ranges over worlds w which are copies of w0 throughout time.  
Since w is a copy of w0, the formula win(w,e,john) is true if and only if win(w0,e,john) is 
true.  The same goes for the formula ∃e[τ(e,w) ⊆ [t,∞)]. Therefore, in a deterministic 
model, (17)b is true if and only if (17)c is.  Using the fact that w0 is a metaphysical 
alternative to itself, one can show by predicate-logical reasoning that (17)c is equivalent 
to (17)d, where the world quantifier has been eliminated, and only the temporal part of 
the meaning of might remains.  So, in a deterministic model, metaphysical might is 
equivalent to will, clearly a bad result. 
(17) a.    At that time, John might have won. 
b.  ∃w[M(w0,t)(w) ∧ ∃e[τ(e,w) ⊆ [t,∞) ∧ win(w,e,john)]] 
c.  ∃w[M(w0,t)(w) ∧ ∃e[τ(e, w0) ⊆ [t,∞) ∧ win(w0,e,john)]] 
d.  ∃e[τ(e, w0) ⊆ [t,∞) ∧ win(w0,e,john)]] 
There are two reactions to this observation.  First, in the spirit of Bach (1986), we 
could accept that the grammar and semantics of English have metaphysical 
presuppositions which happen to be inconsistent with certain metaphysical options.  This 
is a curious result of natural language semantics, not any kind of problem.  My reaction is 
different.  I’d like to have a theory of semantics which is compatible with a range of 
physical and metaphysical assumptions.  Independent of the empirical arguments above, 
this makes me suspicious about the Mondadori-Condoravdi analysis.  I can’t prove it, but 
my position is that if speakers assumed all possible worlds are deterministic, they would 
use counterfactual modals in exactly the way that they do.8 
My conclusion from the office/orchid, sports-math, and chess match examples is this.  
There are scenarios and examples which in their syntactic and semantic properties (such 
as the specific syntactic and lexical forms that are involved, and the time-sensitivity of 
the modal claim) are like the examples Mondadori and Condadori wanted to analyze, but 
where the modal base can not be metaphysical, because there are facts about the base 
world at the reference time which exclude the truth of the complement of the modal.  
Given the definition of metaphysical modality, these are also facts about metaphysical 
alternatives, and so the complement of the modal is not true in the future in any 
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metaphysical alternative.  Thus counterfactual readings of might have and could have do 
not always exploit a metaphysical modal base. 
3. Circumstantial modality 
In all the scenarios and examples, there are some facts about the base world (the specific 
location of rot, the strategy that Ljubojević has settled on together with the fact that he 
never changes strategy, the results of league play up to week 11) that allow or exclude the 
outcome described in the circumstantial modal sentence.  I hypothesize that rather than 
being metaphysical or epistemic, the modal base in these examples is determined by such 
facts.  That is, I will analyze the modality of might and could in these examples as 
circumstantial or factual modality.  (18) is a variation on an example from Kratzer (1991) 
that illustrates the notion of circumstantial modality.  We are looking at a region of an 
Earth-like planet through the lens of telescope, and observe an area with certain 
conditions (temperate climate, loamy soil, partial shade, morning and afternoon sun, etc.)  
One of us says (18).  The statement can be paraphrased ‘the circumstances of climate, 
soil, etc. there are consistent with the growth of Hydrangeas.’  To judge the statement 
true, one must pay attention to these facts, but ignore some other ones, such as the fact 
that hydrangeas were never introduced on the planet, and that (let us stipulate) it is 
impossible for hydrangeas to get to the planet. 
(18) Hydrangeas could grow there. 
Kratzer called such readings of modals circumstantial readings.  Although the 
hydrangea example has a certain generic flavor which is absent from the examples under 
discussion in this paper, the examples are in other ways similar, and this is the 
terminology I will apply.  Kratzer proposed that the semantic analysis of such examples 
refers to sets of “relevant” facts or circumstances of the situation.  These sets are called 
circumstantial modal bases or ordering sources.  A fact about the world w is a proposition 
that is true in w.  
The same notion comes up in legal reasoning.  Mr. Jones was accused of attempted 
indecent liberties with a child.  After internet exchanges with Officer Mellard, who 
presented himself as a thirteen-year old female, he met in a shopping mall with Officer 
Arterburn, a young (but adult) policewoman, for the purpose of going elsewhere for 
sexual activity.  He was arrested in the parking lot.  In appeal, his lawyer argued that 
indecent liberties with a child were impossible, because the person in his company was 
an adult.  In the excerpt (19) from the judgment of the Kansas Supreme Court the 
modality for the two occurrences of impossible is circumstantial---it asserts impossibility 
in virtue of a fact of the actual situation (Supreme Court of Kansas, 2001).   The same 
works as a reading of could in the invented example (20).9 
(19) Since Officer Mellard and Officer Arterburn are adults, appellant argues that it was 
legally or factually impossible for him to commit.  He relies on the crime of 
attempted indecent liberties with a child.  Spencer v. State, 264 Kan. 4, 954 P.2d 
1088 (1998), in support of his contention that a crime can be nonexistent because it 
is legally or factually impossible to commit. 
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(20) Mr. Jones could not have taken indecent liberties with a child, because the person in 
his company was an adult. 
The notion of ‘factual’ possibility in this legal discussion appears to be identical to 
the ‘circumstantial’ modality discussed in semantics.  The example is similar to the ones 
discussed here, in that it refers to concrete situation, and in that the possible events of 
taking indecent liberties temporally follow the events in the café and parking lot. 
I will couch my analysis of circumstantial modals in the premise semantics of 
Veltman and Kratzer, specifically the semantics of modals found in Kratzer (1991).10 In 
the simplest version, a set of propositions F that are all true in the base world are 
hypothesized as an implicit parameter of the modal.  F is called a circumstantial modal 
base. The domain of quantification for the modal is the set of worlds where each 
proposition in F is true, i.e. the intersection of F in the possible-worlds construction of 
propositions.  (21) is the compositional structure of (18), with the modal having an 
implicit parameter F. 
(21) [[could F] [hydrangeas grow there]] 
A basic property I want to exploit is that we get different truth values for 
circumstantial modal sentences by choosing different facts.  Earlier, I said that the wife’s 
argument in the tree example paid attention to the specific location of the rot (on the 
driveway side), while the husband’s argument paid attention to the fact that there was rot 
of a certain extent, but ignored the specific location of that rot.  The difference can be 
formalized by assuming that the modals in the wife’s and husband’s statements implicitly 
refer to different circumstantial modal bases.  (22) is a partial description of the wife’s 
facts.   We assume that the husband’s facts are the same, but with p2, the fact which 
describes the specific location of the rot, replaced by a weaker proposition q2. 
(22) Wife’s facts in the Trees scenario (F) 
p1 There is a storm in our yard with such-and-such wind velocity. 
p2 The tree that fell has rot in such-and-such precise position within the trunk. 
p3 Facts about the top of the tree (how large it is, etc.) 
p4 Location of my husband’s office relative to tree. 
p5 Physical or rule-of-thumb theory of tree motions under the influence of wind. 
(23) Husband’s facts (G) 
The same, with p2 replaced by 
q2     The tree has such-and-such amount of rot within the trunk (without specifying 
location within the trunk). 
Let F be the set of facts (22), and let G be the set of facts (23).  The hypothesis is that 
the wife’s modal implicitly refers to F, with the domain of quantification for the 
existential modal being ⋂F, the set of all worlds in which each element of F is true.  The 
husband’s modality implicitly refers to G, and his existential modal ranges over ⋂G.  
Because of the difference between F and G, ⋂F is a proper subset of ∩G in any realistic 
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model.  This makes it possible for there to be a world v where the tree falls on the office, 
and which is an element of ⋂G, but not of ⋂F.  Suppose the husband’s statement is 
formalized as in (24)a, and the wife’s statement is formalized as in (24)b.  If the modal 
expresses an existential world quantification ranging over the intersection of the modal 
base, the husband’s sentence can be true with v as a witness for the existential 
quantification, while the wife’s sentence is also true, because its negation (24)c is false.  
Consequently the husband’s and wife’s statements, which in overt form appear 
contradictory, can both be true.   Simply stated, the change from F to G allows there to be 
a world in the husband’s domain of quantification but not the wife’s domain of 
quantification where the tree falls on the office. 
(24) a.  The tree [could G] have fallen on the office. 
b.  The tree [could F] not have fallen on the office. (not > could) 
c.  The tree [could F] have fallen on the office. 
This captures the intuition that the husband’s and wife’s sentences, while superficially 
contradictory, are both true in their intended senses.  The slyness in the wife’s argument 
comes out as a shift in the implicit modal base.  The shift is required if her sentence is to 
be true, but it makes her statement irrelevant as a counter to the husband. 
The analysis so far does not provide for temporal and intensional variation in the 
modal base.   The modal base in sports math consists of the results of play up to a certain 
time point.  In (25), it is not sufficient to consider the results of play at one time; the 
results of play in both week and 11 and in week 12 are relevant, and must enter into the 
compositional semantics.  So the modal base has to vary with the temporal compositional 
context.   
(25) Mathematically, Buffalo could have reached the playoffs in week 11 but not week 
12. 
Similarly, consider sports-math modals embedded under believe.  (26)a and (26)b 
convey information not about the actual results of play up to week 11, but about Mary’s 
beliefs about the results of play up to week 11.  To model this, the modal base has to vary 
with Mary’s doxastic alternatives.   In each alternative, the modal base should consist of 
propositions describing the results of play in week 11 in that world. 
(26) a. Mary believes that in week 11, there was a mathematical possibility of Buffalo 
reaching the playoffs. 
b. Mary believes that mathematically, in week 11, Buffalo could have reached the 
playoffs 
So the modal base parameter, rather than a constant set of propositions, should be a 
function mapping worlds and times to sets of propositions.  For sports math, the right 
function maps a world and time to propositions describing the results of play in world w 
up to time t.   In (27), the set is described using a question, assuming the construction of a 
question denotation as a function from worlds and times to true atomic answers 
(Karttunen 1977).   
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(27) Circumstantial sports math modal base function 
 Bsm = λtλw[[what NFL team plays what NFL team at what time preceding t in 
regular-season play with what final score in w]] w,t 
One wants to set up the compositional semantics so that in (25),  week 11 and week 
12, and not the utterance time, serve as the time arguments of the modal base function.  In 
(26), the world and time arguments of the modal base function should be the world of a 
doxastic alternative for Mary and week 11 in that world.  Before looking at a mechanism 
for this, let us take into account that the schedule of play for the entire season, and the 
league rules governing participation in the playoffs are also relevant in sports math 
modality.  Suppose this information is represented with an additional function: 
(28) Osm(t)(w) = set of propositions describing schedule of season play in w at t, and 
league regulations in w at t determining participation in the playoffs. 
The simplest move is to combine the two functions into a single premise function Prsm 
by taking the union of the values, as defined in (29). We assume grammatical structures 
where an index i is an argument of the modal, as in (30), and evaluate the logical form 
with respect to an assignment function g such that g(i) = Prsm.   Since what counts as a 
sports-math reading is captured by the premise function, this is a formalization of the 
sentence having a sports-math reading.  The intensional and temporal interactions will 
then fall out as long as in the compositional derivation, the local world and time 
parameters get plugged in as the arguments of g(i).  In a standard intensional semantics, 
the same move is required in interpreting trace indices with an intensional type that are 
bound across an intensional context, such as the VP trace in (31). So it is sufficient to 
assume that the implicit argument of the modal has the status of a null pronoun with the 
type of the intension of an indirect question, as already established in the assumption that 
g(i) = Prsm.  Then an independently motivated compositional mechanism ensures that the 
world and time arguments of the premise function are determined by the local 
compositional context.11 
(29) Prsm = λtλw[Bsm(t)(w) ⋃ Osm(t)(w)] 
(30)  Mary believes [have [[in week 11] [[might 1] [Buffalo reach the playoffs ]]]] 
(31) [[asleep] [2 [Mary believes John is t2]] 
Kratzer (1991) actually built two premise sets separately into the semantics of the 
modal, in order to deal with modals that have two dimensions of contextual dependence, 
and where one dimension may include contradictory constraints.  In a scenario from that 
paper, legal judgments in New Zealand are governed by precedent. Two judges have 
given conflicting judgments about whether deer are financially responsible for damage to 
vegetation that they cause.   Deer 432 has stripped the bark off a freshly planted young 
tree. If the case came to court, the judge could cite the precedent that holds deer 
responsible.  So arguably (32)a is true, where as indicated by the “in view of” phrase, the 
modality is a deontic one capturing New Zealand case law.   (32)b is also true, because a 
judge could cite the other precedent.12 
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(32) a. In view of what the New Zealand judgments provide, Deer 432 may be 
 personally financially responsible for the costs of the damage to the sapling. 
b. In view of what the New Zealand judgments provide, Deer 432 may not be 
personally financially responsible for the costs of the damage to the sapling.   
(may > not) 
We have these three pieces of information that contribute to a contradiction:  
(33) a  Deer 432 has stripped the bark off the sapling. 
b  Deer are financially responsible for damage to vegetation that they cause. 
c  Deer are not financially responsible for damage to vegetation that they cause. 
In the case law system, precedent b can be followed and precedent c ignored, or c 
followed and b ignored.  Since precedent is to be followed as much as possible, it is not 
legitimate to ignore both b and c.  Ignoring a would also resolve the contradiction, but 
case law is not applied to override facts.  In the system proposed in Kratzer (1991), this 
reasoning is captured by putting b and c into an “ordering source” that is separate from 
the modal base that includes a.  The ordering source encodes norms according to New 
Zealand case law.  As a first approximation, an existential modal is true if there is some 
world where every proposition of the modal base is true, where every proposition in a 
maximal consistent subset of the ordering source is true, and where the complement of 
the modal is true.  This allows contradictions in the ordering source to be resolved.13 
In all the examples and scenarios in this paper, there are separate kinds of information 
that are relevant to the modality.  In sports math, we have the results of play up to some 
time, and second, league regulations that determine participation in the playoffs.  In the 
chess match scenarios, we have specific situations involving certain players, and the 
algorithms they were executing or the lines of play they were following.  Second, there is 
the premise that Ljubjović never changes strategy, or that computers behave consistently 
with the programs they are running.  In the tree scenario, we have first the configuration 
of the tree and the orchids at the time of the storm, and second something like a rule-of-
thumb theory about how trees move.   
The league regulations could be contradictory, just like New Zealand case law.  That 
computers follow the programs they are running is a generalization that can be lifted in 
the presence of specific information about cosmic rays hitting a transistor in a certain 
way.  That Ljubojević never changes strategy is presumably an “in the normal course of 
events” generalization that can also be lifted. It is easy to imagine rule-of-thumb physical 
theories being contradictory. So these premises belong in the ordering source. 
Furthermore, contradiction in the ordering source can be used to capture the 
indeterminacy that is part of the husband’s view of things.  The husband is assuming that 
when an externally symmetrical tree in our area falls in a storm, it can fall in any 
direction.   This is captured with an ordering source that includes premises along these 
lines: 
(34) qn If x is an externally symmetrical tree that falls in a storm in our area, then x 
falls in a northerly direction. 
qe If x is an externally symmetrical tree that falls in a storm in our area, then x falls 
in an easterly direction. 
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qs If x is an externally symmetrical tree that falls in a storm in our area, then x falls 
in a southerly direction. 
qw If x is an externally symmetrical tree that falls in a storm in our area, then x falls 
in a westerly direction. 
We have in addition the facts partially listed in (35).  Holding the facts constant, 
exactly one of the ordering propositions in (34) is true.  This captures the husband’s view 
that the tree could have fallen in any direction. 
(35) p1 Tree DF4235 fell in Dryden, NY in Tropical Storm Lee at 17:03 on Sept. 8, 
2011. 
p2 Orchid growth NYDEC87888 was three meters south of DF4235 at 17:03 Sept. 
8, 2011. 
At this point it has emerged that the modality in the tree-orchid example, which I 
previously described as a circumstantial modality, is better analyzed as a mixed 
circumstantial-physical modality, where the physical part is the rule-of-thumb theory of 
tree motion that the husband assumes.14    
(36) is an official definition of the semantics of a future-oriented existential modal in 
the two-parameter theory.15 There are two modal parameters, a modal base B and an 
ordering source O. Each is a set of propositions.  Take a temporally sensitive proposition 
to have type iwt, where i is the type label for times, and w is the type label for world-time 
lines, and t is the type label for truth values.  Then a set of propositions has type (iwt)t.  
 as defined at the bottom means “every proposition in the modal base B is true 
at time  and world ”. 〈w1,t1〉≤O 〈w2,t2〉  means “〈w1,t1〉 is at least as optimal according 
to the ordering source O as 〈w2,t2〉”.  The nested quantifications deal for one thing with 
the possibility of there being unbounded sequences of time-world pairs that are 
increasingly optimal according to the ordering source, so that (contrary to the 
approximate formulation stated earlier) there may not be a single time-world pair that 
witnesses the truth of the existential modal. 
(36)  [[ might ]] g,t,w is the function  f  such that f(B)(O)(p) = 1 iff   
∃ ∃ [ ∧  
            ∀ ∀ [ ∧ 〈 〉 ≤O 〈 〉 → 
                      ∃t3∃w3[ ∧ 〈 〉 ≤O〈 〉 ∧ ∃t4[t3≤t4 ∧p( )( )]]] 
where   iff  ∀q[B(q) → q( )( )]    
and 〈w1,t1〉≤O 〈w2,t2〉  iff  ∀q[O(q) ∧ q(t1)(w1) → q(t2)(w2)]. 
 Look again at how temporal dependence works in this analysis. The evaluated 
logical form (37) is a sports math reading exactly if g(1)=Bsm and g(2)=Osm.  Since g(1) 
has an intensional type iw(iwt)t it gets applied to the local time and world indices of 
evaluation.16 Then B in (36) is Bsm(t’)(w), where 〈t’,w〉 is week 11 in a doxastic 
alternative 〈t,w〉 for John.  Similarly for the ordering-source function g(2). As long as the 
premise functions are time dependent, the denotation of the phrase headed by the modal 
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can be time dependent too.  The sports-math modal base function premise function Bsm is 
time dependent, because Bsm(t)(w) has information about a monotonically increasing set 
of game results as t increases.   In fact, if t < t’ then Bsm(t)(w) ⊆ Bsm(t’)(w), and therefore 
∩Bsm(t’)(w) is a subset of ∩Bsm(t)(w).  So as time passes, the domain of quantification 
shrinks.  This is similar to what happens in the branching-time metaphysical analysis.    
(37)  [[ John believes that  
     [have [[in week 11] [[[might 1] 2] [Buffalo reach the playoffs ]]]] ]] g,t,w 
Really, also the metaphysical analysis should be couched in the general account of the 
compositional semantics of modals.  It is easy enough to do this. We choose a modal base 
function Bmet which maps a time and world to a set of propositions whose intersection is 
the set of metaphysical alternatives to the world at the time.  (38) does it with a modal 
base function whose value is a unit set.  If we combine this with a trivial ordering source, 
then Condoravdi’s analysis is reconstructed in the general scheme of interpretation.17 
(38)  Bmet = λtλwλp[p=M(t,w)] 
The way that I have adopted for capturing temporal and intensional sensitivity for 
counterfactual readings applies to other readings of modals, such as a circumstantial-
deontic reading of (39). This sentence conveys information not about the actual 
regulations and actual circumstances, but about what John believed the state of New 
Zealand case law and the circumstances to have been.  For instance, it is relevant whether 
he believes that Deer 432 stripped the bark from the sapling.   
(39) John believes deer 432 may have been personally financially responsible for the 
costs of the damage to a sapling.  
All of this indicates that the temporal and intensional interactions that are observed 
for counterfactual modals are formally the same as the temporal and intensional 
interactions that are seen for most modals.18  Both the metaphysical analysis proposed by 
Mondadori and Condoravdi and the analysis advocated here fit into a general scheme of 
interpretation that covers these interactions. So while the temporal interactions do fall out 
nicely in the metaphysical analysis, they don’t favor or disfavor that analysis. They are 
the result of the general compositional sensitivity of modals. 
It is also notable that circumstantial modality mixes with legal modality in the deer 
examples in the same way that that circumstantial modality mixes with physical modality 
in the tree examples.  So, assuming the general two-parameter theory of the semantics of 
modality and the way it is applied in other cases, if speakers use a rule-of-thumb physical 
modality represented in the ordering source, it is predictable that it should mix with a 
circumstantial modal base to produce a temporally sensitive circumstantial reading. 
How should the anything-is-possible intuitions mentioned in Section 2 be represented 
in the articulated theory?  The wife’s argument in the tree scenario uses a circumstantial 
modal base that captures certain facts about the physical situation of the tree at the past 
reference time, including the orientation of the rot inside.  This is combined with an 
ordering source that captures a rule-of-thumb story about how trees move.  The wife 
would agree, let us assume, that it was in principle possible for a mighty gust of wind to 
push the tree onto the orchids.  Is this compatible with (40) being true relative to the 
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modal parameters that the wife is assuming?   Confronted with the possibility of the 
mighty gust, the wife could reply that although anything is possible, she meant that the 
tree could not have fallen on the orchids in a normal course of events.  The notion of a 
normal course of events can be encoded in an ordering source that captures a rule-of-
thumb account of tree motion.   For her sentence to be true, there should (roughly) be no 
maximal way of satisfying the ordering source that absolutely satisfies the modal base 
and has the tree falling on the orchids.   This is compatible with the tree falling on the 
orchids in a world that satisfies the modal base, but not a maximal part of the ordering 
source.  Worlds where the tree falls on the orchids are possible according to the modal 
base, but are not normal according to the ordering source. 
(40) The tree could not have fallen on the orchids.  The rot was on the other side. 
This account using the ordering source is not my account of the truth of the husband’s 
sentence.  The husband does not simply mean that the tree could have fallen on the 
orchids in freak contingencies, because this is very weak.  He means that in view of the 
answers to the questions about the circumstances that it is relevant to ask, and a theory of 
tree motion that it is reasonable to assume, the tree could just as well have fallen on the 
orchids.19   
4.  A time dependence puzzle   
According to the analysis from the previous section, if sentence (41) is true, it is because 
the intended circumstantial premise function maps the base world w0 and the time 12:00 
to a set of propositions that is consistent with John finishing the race, given also the 
theory of runner performance that is captured by the intended ordering source function. If 
we are talking about possibility in view of the physical state of John’s body, then the 
circumstantial premises might be that the energy level in John’s muscles is high, his 
blood sugar is high, etc.    So the circumstantial premise set is along the lines of what is 
described at the top in (41)c.  Let’s assume that each premise is true at world w0 and time 
t12:00, and that the set of premises is consistent with John subsequently finishing the race 
(and with a maximal consistent part of the ordering source). Then there is an alternative 
〈t1,w1〉 that is in the intersection of B(t12:00)(w0,) and a time t2 following t1, such that in 
world w1 John finishes at a time t2. For (41) to be true, the premise set B(t12:30)(w0) should 
exclude John finishing (in a world consistent with a maximal consistent part of the 
ordering source). Assume that this is because physiological parameters have changed in 
the way exemplified at the bottom in (41)c. 
(41) a.  At noon, John still might have finished the race.   
b.  But at 12:30, he could not have finished the race. 
c.  B(t12:00)(w0) = {…, the ATP level in John’s leg muscles is 70%,  
John’s blood sugar level is 81%, … } 
 B(t12:30)(w0) = {…, the ATP level in John’s leg muscles is 20%,  
John’s blood sugar level is 19%, … } 
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(42) presents a puzzle by describing a function B’ which maps w0 and t12:30 to time-
shifted versions of the premises at w0 and t12:00.  According to B’(t12:30)(w0) the energy 
level in John’s legs was high half an hour earlier, John had high blood sugar levels half 
an hour earlier, and so forth.20  Since each of the original premises was true in w0 at 
12:00, the new premises are true in w0 at 12:30.  So those are facts about w0 at t12:30.  
Assume that all of the premises are time-shifted in this way. Then each element of 
B’(t12:30)(w0) is a fact about w0 at t12:30.  So by formal criteria, B’ is a circumstantial 
premise function. 
(42) B’(w0,t12:30) = {…, the ATP level in John’s leg muscles was 70% half an hour 
earlier, John was confident half an hour earlier, … } 
 Remember that 〈t1,w1〉 is an alternative to 〈t12:00,w0〉 where John subsequently finishes 
the race.  Because of the correspondence between B(t12:00)(w0) and B’(t12:30)(w0), the pair 
〈t1+30min,w1〉 is an element of the intersection of B’(t12:30)(w0).  Let’s make the 
additional assumption that, because of the length of the race, the time in w1 where John 
finishes would have to be more than 30 minutes after t1.  In that case, the pair 
〈t1+30min,w1〉 is a witness for the truth of (43) relative to B’. This gives the unwanted 
result that sentence (41)b is false.  Intuitively, it seems false in the scenario where John 
has no energy in his muscles at 12:30.   
(43) At 12:30, he could have finished the race. 
The problem must be that B’ is an ‘unnatural’ circumstantial premise function, which 
should be excluded somehow.  Notice the way how odd (44) sounds.   
(44) At 12:30, in view of his physical condition half an hour before, he could have 
finished the race. 
The need for constraint on premise functions is not very surprising, because in 
general, only certain kinds of premise functions are used in evaluating natural language 
modals. (45) describes an unnatural premise function for a deontic modal, which picks 
out the zoning regulations for the town of Ithaca at 12:00, and college regulations at 
12:30.  Suppose that the college regulations do not allow open book exams, but that open 
book exams are consistent with the zoning regulations.  With this crazy premise function, 
(43) is true, not because any regulations have changed, but because the premise function 
has an odd time-dependent conditional description similar to the predicate ‘grue’ of 
Goodman (1955).  It seems very difficult to understand (43) as true in the described 
circumstances.21 This means that the premise function O must be excluded somehow, 
either in the semantic or the pragmatic component. 
(45) O(t12:00)(w0) =  the set of zoning regulations of the Town of Ithaca in w0 at t12:00 
O(t12:30)(w0) = the set of regulations for giving final exams of the Cornell College of 
Arts and Sciences in w0 at t12:30 
(46) At noon, I could still have given an open book exam.  But by 12:30, I could not 
have given an open book exam. 
These problems are symptoms of the modal semantics I am working having so much 
freedom in the choice of premise functions.  From what I have said so far, anything of the 
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right type counts as a premise function.  The examples above indicate that the space of 
premise functions has to be restricted, or more broadly, mechanisms have to be identified 
by which speakers and hearers are able to agree on rather specific premise functions.   
For circumstantial modality, one possibility is to constrain what counts as a fact about a 
world and time.  If John having low blood sugar in w0 at t12:30 counts a fact about w0 and 
t12:30, but John having high blood sugar half an hour before does not count as a fact about 
w0 and t12:30, then the range of B’ is not a set of facts.  This offers a principled way of 
excluding it.22 
Here is another approach. If an expert on road races asserted the sentences in (41), I 
would take her to relying on some kind of rule-of-thumb, experience-based theory about 
how road races turn out given the physical state of runners.   I would also assume that she 
is using a theory and corresponding properties of the circumstances that have better 
predictive power than competitors.  It is clear that predictions about race success that are 
based on the physical state of the runner at the reference time are more reliable than 
predictions that are based on the physical state of the runner half an hour before.  If we 
are talking about the possibilities at 12:30 of John finishing, his physical state at 12:00 is 
of some relevance, but his physical state at 12:30 is much more relevant.  Any degree of 
strength in his legs at 12:00 is trumped by his legs being weak at 12:30.  On this 
hypothethis, B’ should be excluded because the theory of race success that goes with it 
obviously has less predictive power than one based on B. 
5. Summary 
Section 2 argued that the modality in counterfactual modals was not always 
metaphysical, because there are examples and scenarios where facts about the base world 
and reference time either absolutely exclude the outcome described by the complement of 
the modal, or exclude the outcome occurring in a normal course of events. The problem 
for the metaphysical analysis is that these facts are also facts about metaphysical 
alternatives.  The examples also showed that the truth value of counterfactual modals 
varies according to what facts about the base world one “pays attention to”.   The 
modality in counterfactual modals is not epistemic, because in some cases there are no 
agents who have the information that supplies the domain of quantification for the modal. 
Section 3 proposed an analysis using circumstantial modal bases, which capture a 
context-dependent set of facts about the base world and reference time.   This permits 
some facts of about the base world to not be facts about the alternatives described by the 
modal base.  Context- or purpose-dependent variation in truth value was captured 
straightforwardly, by assuming different circumstantial modal bases.  The analysis was 
formulated in a version of the premise semantics for modality that used time and world-
dependent premise sets.  This accounts for the temporal dependence and the similar 
intensional dependence of counterfactual modality, in a way that is formally identical to 
the temporal and intensional dependence seen with most modals.   
The final version of the theory followed Kratzer (1991) in using two implicit functions 
whose values are premise sets, the modal base and a separate ordering source.  In many 
of the core examples of counterfactual modality, the ordering source encodes a rule-of-
thumb physical theory, which combines with a circumstantial modal base.   
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  A pocket version of the analysis is that “the tree could have fallen on the orchids” is 
true if and only if the tree falling on the orchids is consistent with the answers to the 
questions about the circumstances that it is relevant to ask, and with a consistent reading 
of a rule-of-thumb theory of tree motion that it is relevant to assume. 
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Endnotes 
1.  Whatever the implementation, the evidence for this scope relation seems good.  
Condoravdi points out that in the German example (i), the have form hätte is in the 
V2 position, so that it is syntactically above the modal kőnnen.  As pointed out in Yun 
(2006), Korean also has the temporal and modal operators in a morpho-syntactic 
order isomorphic to the logical one.  Examples (ii) and (iii) are quoted from Yun. 
(i)  Er hätte noch gewinnen kőnnen. 
(ii) ku-ka iki-l swu-to iss-ess-ta.  kulenaku-nun kyelkwuk ci-ess-ta  
he win might PAST but he eventually lost PAST 
‘he might have won, but he eventually lost’  
Syntactic and semantic scope of operators:  … win) might) PAST). 
(iii) ku-ka imi iki-ess-ul swu iss-ta 
he already win PAST might 
 ‘he might already have won’  (epistemic). 
Syntactic and semantic scope of operators:  … win) PAST) might). 
An obvious possibility about English is that since modals do not have participial 
forms, a syntax-semantics mismatch is forced, with a semantically subordinate modal 
surfacing in the syntactically superior position.  In Swedish however, the counterpart of 
can does have a participial variant, as shown in (iv).  Nevertheless counterfactual have-
modal combinations surface with the modal in the V2 position, as shown in (v).  Notice 
however that the modal kunde in (v) is a past tense one, so that the temporal operator 
scoping over the modal could be the past tense.  Stowell (2004) makes a similar proposal 
for English. 
(iv)  Jag har            inte kunnat       tänka       på  det.  
         I      have-pres not  can-supine think-inf on  it 
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‘I haven’t been able to think about it.’ 
(v)  Jag kunde     ha            dödats 
 I     can-past  have-inf  kill-supine-passive 
 ‘I could have been killed.’ 
The German order is apparently also possible in Swedish, though perhaps only rarely, 
marginally, or in restricted morpho-syntactic contexts. (vi) and (vii) are simplified from 
examples found online by Mats Rooth.  
(vi)  Om bomben    hade       sprängts,                      hade       människor kunnat  
if     bomb-def have-pst detonate-supine-pass   have-pst people-pl   can-pst 
dödats,                säger      polisen. 
kill-supine-pass  say-pres police-def 
‘If the bomb had been detonated, people could have been killed, say the police.’ 
(vii) Människor hade       kunnat       dödats                i  den här  katastrofen.  
 people        have-pst can-supine kill-supine-pass in the here catastrophe. 
‘People could have been killed in this catastrophe.’ 
2. Related proposals are made in Abusch (1998) and von Stechow (2003).  In the former, 
future-oriented modal have in their scope an operator which substitutes an interval 
(n,∞)  for evaluation time parameter n, with the effect of stretching the evaluation time 
forward.  This is used to analyze interactions between past tense and future-oriented 
modals. 
3. See Thomason (1984) for a formal development. 
4. In (7b) the wife’s sentence uses could rather than might because in a version with 
might, the negation can not scope over the modal.  But as I understand it, the two modal 
are equivalent in this context.  Some speakers have told me that other examples sound 
more natural with could in place of might.  Such speakers should make the substitution. 
5.  The “merging” of the belief attitude with a doxastic existential modal could result 
from the modal-logic identity ¨◊p ≡¨p, or from the mechanism proposed in Hacquard 
(2010). 
6. That the justification in (16) uses a counterfactual suggests a logical link between the 
simple modal sentences analyzed in this paper, and counterfactuals with if. The 
semantics for simple counterfactual modals stated in Section 3 uses premise semantics, 
and this semantics is used as a semantics for counterfactuals with if by Veltman (1976) 
and Kratzer (1981).  So it should be possible to check the validity of the argument 
formally.  I conjecture that this would show that the two speakers of (15) and (16) 
could not be assuming the same modal base and ordering source, because relative to an 
ordering source that includes the information that Ljubojević never changes strategy, 
(15) would be false.  This would sustain the claim that these examples involve a change 
in contextual parameters.  See the end of Section 3 and footnote 19 for my position on 
the similarity between (15)-(16) and Lewis-Sobel sequences of counterfactuals.  
7.  Thanks to a NALS reviewer for bringing up world-time lines with discontinuities. 
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8. The Buffalo and Shredder examples also involve determinism, because for the 
counterexamples to work, there must be some facts about the base world that absolutely 
exclude Buffalo winning, or Shredder 9 defeating Shredder 10.  While this is a kind of 
determinism, it is a different because it does not require worlds being deterministic.   
9. As I understand things, the court considered the assertion of impossibility in (19) 
correct in the intended reading, which I have hypothesized is a circumstantial reading. 
The court rejected the argument as a whole as irrelevant, given the established legal 
interpretation of the notion of attempted crime.  I don’t know what the court meant with 
“legally” in “legally or factually impossible”. 
10.  See Veltman (1976), Kratzer (1981,1991), and Lewis (1981).  The main application 
of premise semantics is to counterfactuals with if.  These are not being analyzed here.  
However, as mentioned in footnote 6, there are logical links between bare 
counterfactual modals, and counterfactuals with if.  In many cases, when a sentence like 
(i) with a counterfactual modal is true, there is a corresponding true counterfactual with 
if like (ii).  Sentence (iii) is an if-counterfactual for the trees scenario. 
(i)  In week 11 of the football season, mathematically, Buffalo could still have 
reached the playoffs. 
(ii)  If Detroit had defeated Miami in week 12, Washington had defeated Cincinnati in 
Week 12 by at least 21 points, … , and Arizona had defeated San Diego by at least 
14 points in Week 17, then Buffalo would have reached the playoffs. 
(iii)  If the internal rot had been on the opposite side, the tree would/might have fallen 
on the office. 
11.  Putting aside times, in the VP-topicalization example (31), the index 2 has to have an 
intensional type set, rather than an extensional type et, in order for the semantics to 
refer to individuals that are asleep at Mary’s doxastic alternatives, rather than 
individuals that are asleep in the base world.  A local interpretation with type et is 
obtained with the “intensional traces and pronouns rule” presented by Mats Rooth in 
class lectures at Cornell:   
(i) If α is an empty category or pronoun with index 〈n,sa〉 then〚α〛g,w = g(〈n,sa〉)(w). 
Let the VP trace in (31) have index 〈2,set〉. Then 〚[VPt]〈2,set〉〛g,w = g(〈2,set〉)(w), with 
type et and world parameter of evaluation plugged in as the argument of the 
interpretation of the variable.  In my system times are separated from worlds: 
(ii) If α is an empty category or pronoun with index 〈n,iwa〉, then〚α〛g,t,w = 
g(〈n,iwa〉)(t)(w).   
Let the argument of might in (30) have index 〈1,iw(iwt)t〉, and let g(〈1,iw(iwt)t〉) = 
Prsm.  Then the interpretation of the argument of might relative to g, t, and w is 
g(〈1,iw(iwt)t〉)(t)(w) = Prsm(t)(w), with the premise function applied to the time and 
world parameters of evaluation.   
The treatment in von Fintel and Heim (ms.), Chapter 3, of outside intensionality 
interacting with modals plugs in the world parameter of evaluation as an argument of 
the modal parameter in the lexical entry of the modal. In their rule (iii), the implicit 
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argument of the modal R, (which is a function from worlds to propositions), is applied 
to the world parameter in the term R(v).    
(iii)〚must〛g,v = λRsstλqst∀u[R(v)(u) → q(u)] 
12.  Kratzer’s version of the deer example did not have reference to a specific deer and 
damage incident.  Adding it brings out that the legal modality can mix with a 
circumstantial modal base. 
13.  The subset of the ordering source is to be maximized while preserving consistency 
with the modal base.  Let G be the family of subsets of the union of the modal base and 
the ordering source that contain the modal base and are consistent (have a non-empty 
intersection).  Then an existential modal is true (relative to the modal base and ordering 
source) if the complement of the modal is consistent with some element of G that is 
maximal in the subset ordering on G.  (An element of G is a set of propositions. In 
maximizing the element, as many propositional premises as possible are added while 
preserving consistency.) 
14.  The framework with two premise sets creates flexibility in where the husband’s 
modal parameters could differ from the wife’s.  The difference could be located in the 
modal base, the ordering source, or both.   
15.  This is a version of the definition of human possibility from Kratzer (1981b) that 
builds in a future operator.  Often a more intuitive term is “good possibility” or “easy 
possibility”, since the corresponding adverbs can be inserted:  
(i) The tree could easily have fallen on the orchids. 
It may be advisable to tread the futurity separately from the modality, or to 
condition the futurity on aspectual type. This would allow simultaneous readings such 
as this one to be treated. John is an expert petroleum geologist and investor.  In 2003, 
he finds a ranch property in Ecuador and analyzes its geology very carefully.  He 
applies best-practice methodology for petroleum prospecting.  He decides the ranch 
has a good probability of containing a large oil reserve, and on December 1, 2003 buys 
the property together with a partner.  Unfortunately, expensive drilling establishes that 
there is only worthless salty water under the ranch.  The partner’s opinion on Dec. 18, 
2007: 
(ii) We bought a ranch which (when we bought it) might well have contained a 
significant oil reserve.  But unfortunately there is no oil on this ranch.  Let’s sell 
it and move on to the next project. 
I assume that in this example, the modal does not build in futurity, and that there 
should not be a future operator in the immediate scope of the modal.  The ice cream 
example in Von Fintel and Gillies (2008) seems similar.  Sophie was looking for some 
ice cream and opened the freezer.  None is there.  Asked why she opened the freezer, 
she replied: 
(iii)  There might have been ice cream in the freezer.  
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Maybe these are epistemic readings (as von Fintel and Gillies’ discussion implies), 
but they could also involve a circumstantial modal base, mixed for the ranch example 
with an ordering source capturing best-practice prospecting methodology.   
16.  This is how the dependence on w and t comes about in the account explained in 
footnote 11.  [[ might ]] g,t,w as defined in (36) has no dependence on w or t.  
17.  This definition assumes that M(t,w) has type iwt.  In definition (3)d it has type wt, 
and that definition uses identification of the time t across worlds. 
18.  I say “most” to allow for modals with special scope or deictic properties. 
19.  And on my account, combining the husband’s and wife’s arguments into an 
argument with the conclusion p∧¬p is a fallacy of equivocation in the shift from the 
husband’s modal base function to the wife’s.  This agrees with the intuition about the 
slyness of the wife’s argument.  Lewis-Sobel sequences such as (i) and (ii) are 
superficially similar to the tree examples, but Lewis maintains that they do not 
involve a shift in implicit parameters (Lewis 1973:10). 
(i) If I (or you, or anyone else) walked on the lawn, no harm at all would come of it;  
but if everyone did that, the lawn would be ruined. 
(ii) If the USA threw its weapons into the sea, there would be war; but if the USA and 
the other nuclear powers all threw their weapons into the sea tomorrow there would 
be peace (…). 
The wife’s reaction to the possibility of the mighty gust as I analyze it reflects 
Lewis-Sobel thinking, but that the disagreement between the wife and the husband is 
different. 
20. To complete the example one needs a complete definition of B’. B’ is a systematically 
time-shifted version of B, with B’(t)(w) = B(t-30min)(w).   
21.  Perhaps not impossible though.  Suppose the value of the ordering function is the set 
of regulations that we are disposed to pay attention to at t.  At 12:00, we are of the 
opinion that University regulations can freely be ignored.  By 12:30 we have started 
paying attention to them.  So we can no longer give an open book exam, because we 
became disposed to pay attention to University regulations. 
22.  This option is suggestive of the proposal in Kratzer (2002) that “propositional facts” 
are relevant to the evaluation of counterfactuals. 
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